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Note
A Vote for Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court’s Severe
Burden Test for State Election Regulations That
Adversely Impact an Individual’s Right to Vote
Joshua A. Douglas*
Introduction
The presidential election on November 2, 2004, was perhaps one
of the most watched and contentious elections in recent memory.
Both major parties knew that the race would come down to several
battleground states, including Ohio.1  The real battle in Ohio, how-
ever, began a day or two before Election Day, when several federal
judges clashed over whether to allow partisan challengers at the polls.
On October 31, 2004 and November 1, 2004, two separate district
court judges ruled that an Ohio election statute allowing political par-
ties and groups of five or more candidates to place challengers at elec-
tion precincts to challenge the eligibility of particular voters
constituted a “severe burden” on the voters’ rights, and that the stat-
ute had not met the strict scrutiny standard of review required for
* J.D. expected 2007, The George Washington University Law School.  I would like to
thank Professor Spencer Overton, Tommaso Bencivenga, and Kimberly L. Sikora Panza for their
insightful substantive and editorial comments, and Bari Douglas for reading early drafts of this
Note and for her overall support.
1 See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Ad-
ministration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 938–39 (2005) (discuss-
ing the importance of the outcome in Ohio to the 2004 presidential election).
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severe burdens.2  In an expedited appeal decided on the morning of
the election, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in a
2-1 decision, determining that partisan poll challengers did not create
a severe burden on voters’ rights, and that the statute had survived the
lower level of scrutiny.3  After the Supreme Court declined to review
the case,4 the Republican Party immediately placed its challengers at
election sites to challenge voters as they prepared to exercise their
constitutional right to vote.5
What is striking about these three decisions is not that they came
to opposite conclusions regarding whether challengers amount to a
severe burden on voters’ rights.  Instead, the opinions demonstrate
that judges have few guidelines to inform their decisions on the severe
burden question and can make their determinations on an ad hoc ba-
sis.6  Judges simply review the regulation and subjectively decide
whether it seems to impose a severe burden.  Thus, the severe burden
test is nebulous and unclear, resulting in vague decisions that fail to
distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional state election
regulations.  Because George W. Bush won Ohio’s twenty electoral
votes by a slim margin,7 the Ohio decisions may have greatly influ-
enced the outcome of the presidential election.  A judge’s subjective
interpretation of the burdens a regulation imposes should not have
such a significant impact on the U.S. political system, because judges
generally should not decide elections.8  This Note provides a modicum
of direction and objectivity to the analysis by suggesting a clear mech-
anism for determining when a regulation imposes a severe burden on
voters’ rights.
2 Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 (S.D. Ohio), rev’d sub nom. Summit
County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004); Sum-
mit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, No. 5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22539, at *19–21 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004), rev’d, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
3 Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 551
(6th Cir. 2004).
4 See Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2004) (Stevens, J., in chambers).
5 Associated Press, Poll Challenges OK’d, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.fox
news.com/story/0,2933,137229,00.html.
6 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword, Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 150 (1997) (highlighting the importance of the type of doctrinal test chosen in
analyzing the constitutionality of a regulation).
7 See CNN.com Election Results: U.S. President / Ohio, http://www.cnn.com/ELEC-
TION/2004/pages/results/states/OH/P/00/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (stating that Bush
won Ohio by less than two percent of the total vote).
8 But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (halting the manual recounts
in Florida, resulting in the election of George W. Bush as President).
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Part I of this Note analyzes the severe burden test and discusses
the interplay between a state’s right to administer and regulate elec-
tions and a citizen’s fundamental right to vote.  This part also provides
a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court’s formulation of the severe
burden test from its origins in Anderson v. Celebrezze9 to its most re-
cent articulation in Clingman v. Beaver,10 and demonstrates why the
severe burden test is too subjective in its current formulation.  Part II
examines the three Ohio decisions in detail as a case study to demon-
strate the courts’ vague application of the severe burden test.  Part III
articulates the proposed solution: the creation of a “five percent rule”
for the severe burden test, which stipulates that state regulations that
deny more than five percent of the electorate of its right to vote are
per se severe and require strict scrutiny review, while regulations that
burden less than five percent of voters are subject only to the rational
basis test.11  Part III then discusses why the five percent rule, derived
from the Voting Rights Act, will ensure fair and efficient elections
while protecting voters’ rights.  This Part also suggests methods to en-
act the five percent rule, either through a congressional act as part of
an update to the Voting Rights Act or via the Supreme Court in a
reformulation of its current judicially created test.  Finally, Part III
discusses how the five percent rule would have worked in the Ohio
cases and demonstrates its application in other voting rights situations.
The Note concludes that promulgating a concrete standard for the se-
vere burden test may provide judges, political parties, states, and vot-
ers with greater certainty during the inevitable court battles
surrounding the upcoming 2008 elections.
I. The Severe Burden Test
A. The Competing Interests
Cases involving state-mandated election procedures often entail a
conflict between an individual’s right to vote and the state’s interest in
regulating elections.  On the one hand, an individual’s right to vote is
perhaps the most important right a citizen has in our democracy.  As
the Supreme Court stated, “no right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live.  Other rights, even the
9 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–89 (1983).
10 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586–87 (2005).
11 This Note does not analyze the severe burden test as it relates to political party ballot
access questions or redistricting.  Instead, the solution solely seeks to modify the test when a
state regulation affects the ability of an individual voter to cast his or her ballot.
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most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”12  In addi-
tion, the Court has recognized that “[a] citizen’s right to a vote free of
arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as
a right secured by the Constitution.”13
On the other hand, the Constitution allows states to regulate elec-
tion administration.14  In Storer v. Brown,15 the Supreme Court af-
firmed the power of the states to manage elections:16 “[A]s a practical
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic process.”17  Similarly, the Court has deter-
mined that prevention of election fraud is a compelling interest that
permits state regulation of elections.18  The interplay between a citi-
zen’s fundamental right to vote and the state’s right to regulate elec-
tions underlies the Court’s creation of the severe burden test.
B. Development of the Severe Burden Test—Anderson and
Norman
The Supreme Court’s promulgation of the severe burden test be-
gan in Anderson v. Celebrezze,19 and the Court further developed the
test in Norman v. Reed.20  In both cases, the Court found that the
State’s election regulation imposed an unacceptable burden on voters’
rights and struck down the regulation as unconstitutional.
In Anderson, the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Ohio statute that required independent parties to declare their candi-
dates in March, while the major political parties could declare their
12 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
13 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
14 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.”).
15 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
16 Id. at 726, 736 (upholding two California laws that (1) restricted access of independent
candidates to the general election if they had been defeated in a party primary and (2) restricted
access of candidates to a party primary if they had been registered or affiliated with another
political party within one year of that year’s primary election).
17 Id. at 730.
18 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); see also JOHN FUND, STEALING ELEC-
TIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR DEMOCRACY (2004) (advocating greater state reg-
ulation of elections); Publius, Securing the Integrity of American Elections: The Need for Change,
9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 278 (2005) (arguing that increased state regulations do “not disen-
franchise voters” and claiming that there is “no evidence to suggest otherwise”).
19 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
20 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992).
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nominees closer to Election Day.21  The Court ruled that the statutory
deadline placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associa-
tional rights of the supporters of independent candidates.22  To reach
this conclusion, the Court created a three-part “balancing of interests”
test to analyze state election laws that potentially infringe individual
rights while furthering legitimate state interests.23  First, a reviewing
court must “consider the character and magnitude of the asserted in-
jury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”24  Second, the court must “iden-
tify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justi-
fications for the burden imposed by its rule.”25  Third, the court must
“not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those inter-
ests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”26  Although the Court rec-
ognized that “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” the
Court ruled that the State’s regulation here would impose a significant
injury to independent voters who may not be able to vote for the can-
didate of their choice.27  The Court concluded that the burden on vot-
ers outweighed the State’s interests in voter education or political
stability.28
The Court further developed the severe burden test in Norman v.
Reed when it determined that a state’s prohibition on new political
parties bearing an established party’s name created a severe burden
on voters’ rights, because the prohibition could foreclose the opportu-
nity for voters to associate themselves with the established party.29
Candidates for county office sought to run under the party name
“Harold Washington Party,” which was an “established” political
21 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790–91.
22 Id. at 806.
23 Id. at 789.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 788, 795.
28 Id. at 796, 806.  Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that
the Constitution does not require that a State allow any particular Presidential can-
didate to be on its ballot, and so long as the Ohio ballot access laws are rational and
allow nonparty candidates reasonable access to the general election ballot, this
Court should not interfere with Ohio’s exercise of its Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 power.
Id. at 808 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 282–83, 288–89 (1992).
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party in the city of Chicago.30  The Court ruled that the right of citi-
zens to create and develop new political parties derives from the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore that a state may hinder
that right only through a “demonstration of a corresponding interest
sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.”31  The Court used the
word “severe” for the first time in discussing its test, determining that
a state must narrowly tailor any “severe” restrictions on voters’ rights
and that courts should review a severe burden under the strict scrutiny
test.32  State regulations that are not severe require review only under
a lower standard, such as rational basis or intermediate scrutiny.33
The Court declared that,
[t]o the degree that a State would thwart [citizens’ rights] by
limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, we have
called for the demonstration of a corresponding interest suf-
ficiently weighty to justify the limitation, and we have ac-
cordingly required any severe restriction to be narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.34
Justice Souter, for the majority, concluded that the State’s restriction
on political party names imposed a severe burden on voters of new
political parties, but the Court failed to explain what made the burden
severe.35  The Court struck down the regulation, ruling that it failed to
pass strict scrutiny review because there were other less intrusive
mechanisms available to achieve the State’s goals of avoiding voter
confusion, such as requiring the county office candidates to obtain for-
mal permission to use the name from the established Chicago “Harold
Washington Party.”36
C. The Nebulous Character of the Severe Burden Test—Burdick,
Timmons, and Clingman
Since the decision in Norman v. Reed, the Supreme Court has
never again ruled that a regulation imposed a severe burden on vot-
30 Id. at 283–84.
31 Id. at 288–89.
32 See id. at 289.
33 Id. at 288–89.  Courts have not been consistent in applying this lower standard, alternat-
ing between rational basis and a higher, intermediate standard of review. See, e.g., Swamp v.
Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 1991) (failing to identify the level of scrutiny required for a
burden that the court considered not to be severe); Nat’l Comm. of the U.S. Taxpayers Party v.
Garza, 924 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (upholding a state’s “sore loser” statute as “reasona-
ble, nondiscriminatory,” and “not overly burden[some]” on voters’ rights).
34 Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89 (citation omitted).
35 See id. at 289–90.
36 Id. at 290.
378 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 75:372
ers’ rights, but the Court still has failed to provide a clear mechanism
for determining when a state election law is severe.37  In Burdick v.
Takushi,38 the Court upheld a Hawaii ban on write-in voting, reason-
ing that the state asserted legitimate interests in election administra-
tion that outweighed the limited burden the regulation imposed upon
voters.39  In restating the severe burden test, the Court noted:
[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected
to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn
to advance a state interest of compelling importance.  But
when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, the State’s important regula-
tory interests are generally sufficient to justify the
restrictions.40
The Court explained that subjecting all election regulations to
strict scrutiny is inappropriate because doing so would hamper a
state’s legitimate ability to regulate elections.41  The Court concluded
that the ban on write-in voting did not rise to the level of a severe
burden, although the opinion failed to provide concrete reasons for
this determination.42  The Court upheld the law under a lower stan-
dard of review based on the State’s legitimate interest in election
administration.43
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, concluded that Hawaii’s write-in vot-
ing ban significantly burdened voters’ rights.44  He reasoned that
“[t]he majority’s analysis ignores the inevitable and significant burden
a write-in ban imposes upon some individual voters by preventing
them from exercising their right to vote in a meaningful manner.”45
37 The Court has, however, struck down an election regulation as severely burdening the
associational rights of political parties. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586
(2000).
38 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
39 Id. at 440.
40 Id. at 434 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 433 (“[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the
regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”).
42 See id. at 434.
43 Id. at 439–40.
44 Id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 448.
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Justice Kennedy, however, did not provide any additional reasons for
why he believed the write-in ban severely burdened voters.  Thus,
neither the majority nor the dissent in Burdick adequately provided
concrete objective factors to explain why the burden did or did not
cross the magical line to become severe.
The confusion continued in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party.46  In Timmons, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law
prohibiting “fusion” candidates who appear on the ballot for more
than one political party.47  The Court ruled that the regulation did not
place a severe burden on voters’ rights because the law did not di-
rectly preclude voters affiliated with minor political parties from
choosing their candidates, nor did it exclude a particular group of citi-
zens from voting.48  The Court disagreed with the court of appeals’
decision that the regulation imposed a severe burden, but the majority
opinion provided scant reasoning for its different interpretation, solely
commenting that “[w]e disagree; given the burdens imposed, the bar is
not so high.”49  Therefore, the State only had to demonstrate that its
asserted regulatory interests were “sufficiently weighty” for the regu-
lation to meet the lower standard of review and pass constitutional
muster.50  The Court, however, never provided any reasons for why
the regulation did not impose a severe burden beyond its own knee-
jerk reaction.
In dissent, Justice Stevens recognized the majority’s failure to
provide cogent analysis on the severe burden question, noting that the
majority went to great lengths to identify burdens that the statute did
not inflict but failed to examine the burdens that the statute actually
imposed.51  Justice Stevens reasoned that “[t]he fact that the Party
may nominate its second choice surely does not diminish the signifi-
cance of a restriction that denies it the right to have the name of its
first choice appear on the ballot.”52  Therefore, in Justice Stevens’s
46 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
47 Id. at 353–54, 369–70.
48 Id. at 361, 363.
49 Id. at 363–64.  The Court did list several potential burdens that it believed the statute
did not inflict on voters’ rights, but the Court failed to scrutinize sufficiently the actual burdens
imposed by the statute. See id. at 363.
50 Id. at 364.  Again, the Court failed to identify whether it used rational basis or interme-
diate scrutiny as this lower standard of review.
51 Id. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 Id.
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view, the fusion candidate ban imposed a severe burden and should
have triggered strict scrutiny review.53
The Court’s latest imprecise analysis of the severe burden issue
occurred in Clingman v. Beaver.54  In Clingman, the Court held that
Oklahoma’s “semiclosed” primary system, under which a political
party could invite only its own registered members and voters regis-
tered as Independents to vote in its primary, did not severely burden
the associational rights of the State’s citizenry.55  The Court stated:
These minor barriers between voter and party do not
compel strict scrutiny.  To deem ordinary and widespread
burdens like these severe would subject virtually every elec-
toral regulation to strict scrutiny, hamper the ability of States
to run efficient and equitable elections, and compel federal
courts to rewrite state electoral codes.56
The Court did not, however, state exactly why the burdens imposed
here were only minimal, nor did it clarify whether rational basis or
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test for burdens that are less
than severe.
Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion,57 highlighted the
Court’s lack of reasoning and the fact that the Court’s decision may
allow states—whose election systems are often run by partisan opera-
tives—to have too much power in regulating elections:
[T]he State is itself controlled by the political party or parties
in power, which presumably have an incentive to shape the
rules of the electoral game to their own benefit.  Recognition
of that basic reality need not render suspect most electoral
regulations.  Where the State imposes only reasonable and
genuinely neutral restrictions on associational rights, there is
no threat to the integrity of the electoral process and no ap-
parent reason for judicial intervention.  As such restrictions
become more severe, however, and particularly where they
have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for con-
cern that those in power may be using electoral rules to erect
barriers to electoral competition.  In such cases, applying
heightened scrutiny helps to ensure that such limitations are
truly justified and that the State’s asserted interests are not
53 Id. at 374.
54 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
55 Id. at 584–85, 593.
56 Id. at 593 (citation omitted).
57 Id. at 598 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
2007] A Vote for Clarity 381
merely a pretext for exclusionary or anticompetitive
restrictions.58
Justice O’Connor joined the majority, however, because she believed
that the semiclosed primary amounted only to a reasonable restriction
and did not impose a severe burden upon voters, who simply could
affiliate with the political party of their choosing prior to the voter
registration deadline.59
In dissent, Justice Stevens determined that the State had imposed
a severe burden on voters, explaining that “the impact of the
Oklahoma statute on the voters’ right to vote for the candidate of
their choosing is not a mere ‘burden’; it is a prohibition.”60  Once
again, however, Justice Stevens did not provide a benchmark for de-
termining when an election regulation is severe, but instead simply
made an ad hoc, independent determination of the magnitude of the
restriction on voters’ rights.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the inherent subjectivity
underpinning the Supreme Court’s promulgation and subsequent im-
precise application of the severe burden test.61  Justices can mold their
determinations of what constitutes a severe burden in any way that
seems to fit the particular facts of each case.62  As the case study about
58 Id. at 603.
59 Id. at 603–04.
60 Id. at 610 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens distinguished between an individual’s
right to vote and an individual’s associational rights with a political party. See id. at 612.  This
Note analyzes only burdens placed on an individual’s right to cast a ballot.
61 See Lowell J. Schiller, Recent Development, Imposing Necessary Boundaries on Judicial
Discretion in Ballot Access Cases: Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005), 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 331, 338, 341, 343 (2005) (applauding the result in Clingman and the “inherent sub-
jectivity” judges may employ in analyzing the severe burden test, because the test allows judges
to uphold “legislatures’ constitutional role in determining the manner in which elections will be
conducted”).  The author notes, however, that
Clingman’s addition to the caselaw of ballot access lays bare two fundamental
points.  First, the inherent subjectivity of the First Amendment “severity of the bur-
den” test allows for the Justices’ competing views about the role of the courts in
promoting an open and competitive democracy to drive what is purportedly an
analysis of associational freedoms.  Second, whereas individual voters may develop
complex associational preferences within the political marketplace, those prefer-
ences simply are not mirrored by the current judicial understanding of First
Amendment protections.
Employing a “severity” test is an inherently subjective enterprise: Different
members of the Court described the same burden on associational rights as either a
“minor barrier[ ],” a “modest and politically neutral burden [that was] not alto-
gether trivial,” or a “heavy burden” that might be best classified as a “prohibition”
on protected activity.
Id. at 338 (alterations in original).
62 Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (“One of the most obvious limitations imposed
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the Ohio election reveals, lower courts also have applied the test in an
uneven and imprecise fashion.
II. Case Study: The 2004 Ohio Election Decisions
A. The District Court Decisions
Under Ohio law, any voter can challenge any other voter’s eligi-
bility to cast a ballot.63  Prior to the 2004 presidential election, how-
ever, the Hamilton County, Ohio Republican Party filed under the
applicable statute for permission to place additional challengers at
polling places “in order to challenge voters’ eligibility to vote.”64  The
Republican Party planned to place approximately two-thirds of these
challengers in predominantly African-American precincts.65
Legally registered African-American voters brought suit, seeking
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that would
have required Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell to ban
partisan challengers from the polls.66  The plaintiffs claimed that al-
lowing extra partisan challengers would discriminate against African-
American voters and presented an “undue burden” upon the voters’
ability to cast their ballots successfully.67  The plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that only 14% of new voters in a majority white precinct would
face a challenger, while 97% of new voters in a majority black precinct
would see a challenger.68  After finding that the Republican Party
strategy imposed a severe burden on voters’ rights, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted the plaintiffs’ motion
because the State’s regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve the
by [the Constitution] is that judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule. . . .  [L]aw
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”).
63 The Ohio statute provides:
At any primary, special, or general election, any political party supporting can-
didates to be voted upon at such election and any group of five or more candidates
may appoint to any of the polling places in the county or city one person, a quali-
fied elector, who shall serve as challenger for such party or such candidates during
the casting of the ballots, and one person, a qualified elector, who shall serve as
witness during the counting of the ballots; provided that one such person may be
appointed to serve as both challenger and witness.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (LexisNexis 2005).
64 Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio), rev’d sub nom. Summit
County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 529.
67 Id. at 529, 534.
68 Id. at 530.  It is not clear why the plaintiffs only presented evidence about the effects of
challengers on “new” voters and not all voters.
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compelling state interest of preventing election fraud.69  The decision,
handed down one day before the election, banned partisan challeng-
ers from the polls on Election Day.70
The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s severe burden
test from Anderson and Timmons to analyze the lawfulness of Ohio’s
decision to allow additional partisan challengers at the polls.71  The
court first determined that allowing challengers would inflict a burden
on voters’ ability to cast ballots.72  The Ohio scheme amplified this
burden because partisan challengers had never before appeared at the
polls.73  Further, the Republican Party challengers had minimal train-
ing in Ohio’s election laws, negatively impacting voters by creating an
“extraordinary and potentially disastrous risk of intimidation and de-
lay.”74  This risk of intimidation and delay imposed a severe burden,
the court held, on the voters’ right to cast a ballot.75
Because the presence of Republican Party challengers would im-
pose a severe burden, the court reviewed the decision to allow chal-
lengers under the strict scrutiny test.76  The court determined that the
State had a compelling interest in preventing election fraud,77 but that
the legislature had not narrowly drawn the regulation because there
were other reasonable ways for Ohio to achieve its compelling interest
of running a fair and efficient election.78  Under the statute, bipartisan
election judges and any elector lawfully at the polling place could
challenge the eligibility of any voter.79  The court reasoned that
“[e]lection judges are seasoned, experienced workers in the electoral
process,” and that their presence alone at the polls would adequately
address Ohio’s concern of ensuring that only those eligible to vote
were able to cast a ballot; thus, the presence of the private challengers
was not necessary to satisfy the State’s compelling interest.80
69 Id. at 535–37.
70 Id. at 538.
71 Id. at 534.
72 Id. at 535 (“In the absence of any statutory guidance whatsoever governing the proce-
dures and limitations for challenging voters, and the questionable enforceability of the State’s
and County’s policies regarding good faith challenges and ejection of disruptive challengers from
the polls, there exists an enormous risk of chaos, delay, intimidation, and pandemonium inside
the polls and in the lines out the door.”).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 536.
77 Id. at 536–37.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 536.
80 Id. at 536–37 (“In this situation, the presence and actions of challengers serves the same
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In another lawsuit filed to enjoin Republican Party challengers,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio came to the
same conclusion and determined that challengers would pose a severe
burden on voters’ rights.81  The court’s analysis mirrored the reasoning
of the other Ohio federal district court.82  The court noted that elec-
tion judges alone could adequately serve the compelling governmental
interest of preventing voting fraud, and that the presence of the parti-
san challengers “may pose an undue burden on voters and election
officials.”83  Therefore, the court decided that the regulation allowing
Republican Party challengers at the polls was “not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest.”84
B. The Circuit Court Reverses, and the Supreme Court Denies
Review
On the morning of Election Day, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed both district court decisions and ruled that al-
lowing Republican Party challengers at Ohio polls did not rise to the
level of a severe burden, thus requiring analysis only under a lower
standard of review.85  Judge Rogers, for the court, determined that al-
though challengers may cause longer lines or confusion at polling
sites, the possibility of increased voter confusion did not amount to a
severe burden.86  Therefore, using a lower standard of review that re-
sembled either rational basis or intermediate scrutiny, Judge Rogers
upheld the regulation based on, among other reasons, the State’s need
to administer the election effectively.87  Judge Rogers concluded that
“[t]here is a strong public interest in smooth and effective administra-
interest as that of the election judges except that the presence and actions of the former poses an
unacceptable risk of impeding the work of the election judges.  Since the election judges are the
individuals who are knowledgeable and experienced in the process of identifying potential ineli-
gible voters, asking them the relevant questions, and making determinations, disruption of this
system by over 1100 lawyers who have no experience in the process cannot be said to be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in preventing voter fraud.”).
81 Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, No. 5:04CV2165,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at *19 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004), rev’d, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir.
2004).
82 Id. at *18–21.
83 Id. at *21.
84 Id.
85 Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 551
(6th Cir. 2004) (2-1 decision).
86 Id.
87 Id.
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tion of the voting laws that militates against changing the rules in the
hours immediately preceding the election.”88
Judge Rogers assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring suit against the State.89  Judge Ryan, however, con-
curred in the judgment solely because he believed that the plaintiffs
lacked standing due to their failure to show that they had suffered any
“injury in fact” that was “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical.”90  Judge Ryan thus did not consider the severe burden
question.
In contrast, Judge Cole offered a vigorous dissent in which he
faulted the other judges for not recognizing the burden and “dramatic
effect” that challengers would have on voters.91  Judge Cole expressed
particular concern with the potential effects of challengers on minority
voters, stressing that “partisan challengers, for the first time since the
civil rights era, . . . [would] target precincts that have a majority Afri-
can-American population.”92  Judge Cole also criticized Judge Rog-
ers’s opinion for not examining the district court’s decision under an
“abuse of discretion” standard, which is the appropriate appellate
court standard of review when a trial court grants a temporary re-
straining order.93
The effect of the Sixth Circuit’s judgment was to stay the district
courts’ decisions disallowing partisan challengers, paving the way for
the Republican Party to place its challengers at the polls.94  On the
morning of the election, the Supreme Court immediately denied the
plaintiffs’ application to reinstate the district courts’ rulings.95  Justice
Stevens declared that the decision not to review the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion was based solely on “practical considerations” regarding the
Court’s inability to properly review the parties’ submissions given the
few hours left before the polls opened in Ohio.96  Justice Stevens ad-
ded, however, that “[t]he allegations of abuse made by the plaintiffs
are undoubtedly serious—the threat of voter intimidation is not new
88 Id.
89 Id. at 550.
90 Id. at 551–52 (Ryan, J., concurring) (quotations omitted) (“The plaintiffs have offered
no evidence that the injury they allege will occur tomorrow, has ever occurred before in an Ohio
election or that there has been any threat by the defendants or anyone else that such injury will
occur.”).
91 Id. at 552, 554 (Cole, Jr., J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 552.
93 Id. at 553.
94 Id. at 551.
95 See Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2004) (Stevens, J., in chambers).
96 Id. at 1302.
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to our electoral system—but on the record before me it is impossible
to determine with any certainty the ultimate validity of the plaintiffs’
claims.”97
Thus, while analyzing the exact same issue, two district court
judges and one court of appeals judge ruled that allowing Republican
Party challengers at the Ohio polls constituted a severe burden on
voters’ rights, while one court of appeals judge ruled that challengers
imposed only a minimal burden.  None of the decisions, however, pro-
vided an objective analysis of the scope of the burden on the entire
electorate, instead simply concluding that the burden was or was not
severe based on the judges’ subjective impressions.  For example,
Judge Rogers’s opinion stated that challengers would not impose a
severe burden, but he failed to analyze the actual effect of the chal-
lengers on individual voters or the possible negative impact challeng-
ers would place on entire segments of the electorate.  In dissent, Judge
Cole found merit in the voters’ claims, but he could only guess as to
the law’s impact on actual voters.  Indeed, all of the judges demon-
strated the messy and nebulous character of the Supreme Court’s se-
vere burden test, because the judges had no mechanism to apply the
test in a coherent and consistent manner.
III. The Five Percent Rule: Using Empirical Evidence for the Severe
Burden Test when Analyzing Voter Access to the Polls
A. The “Five Percent Rule” for Election Regulations
The “five percent rule,” which derives from the Voting Rights
Act,98 is a solution to the nebulousness of the severe burden test for
laws that impact an individual’s right to vote.  This rule provides
judges with a benchmark to analyze state election regulations: both a
voter and the state must present empirical evidence suggesting that an
election regulation will or will not burden more than five percent of
the voters, or 10,000 voters, whichever is less, in a covered jurisdic-
tion.99  If the regulation imposes a burden that exceeds either of these
triggers, the regulation is per se severe and must survive strict scrutiny
review.100  If, however, the regulation does not burden the voting
97 Id.
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(i) (2000).
99 The triggers of five percent or 10,000 voters are referred to in this Note solely as the
“five percent rule,” although either measure can apply depending on the size of the “covered
jurisdiction” as defined by the Voting Rights Act. See infra Part III.B.
100 The rule will not invalidate all state regulations that impact five percent of the electo-
rate; the state just has a higher burden to demonstrate the necessity of the regulation.
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rights of five percent or 10,000 voters, the state law must pass only the
rational basis test.  Rational basis is the appropriate test for minimal
burdens because this standard of review provides wide leeway to
states to impose election regulations that burden only a small number
of voters.  Therefore, this new rule also eliminates the confusion over
whether to analyze minimal burdens under a rational basis or interme-
diate scrutiny standard.101
Plaintiffs who bring a suit challenging an election regulation will
have the initial requirement of demonstrating, through a valid study,
that the regulation burdens the requisite number of voters.  Empirical
evidence that can demonstrate a severe burden includes data that a
regulation intimidates five percent or more of voters from going to the
polls, causes so much confusion that voters are unable to vote, or
somehow restricts voters from successfully casting a ballot.  This data
can be based on surveys, studies of similar election systems from other
jurisdictions, or common voting models, to name just a few examples
of acceptable empirical evidence.  If the plaintiff is unable to offer
empirical data demonstrating a burden on five percent or more of vot-
ers, the regulation is considered not to be severe and must withstand
only rational basis review.
Once the plaintiff meets this initial threshold, however, the evi-
dentiary requirement shifts and the state must present its own study
that the burden imposed reaches less than five percent of voters.  If
the plaintiff presents a valid study and the state is unable to refute the
five-percent showing, the burden is considered per se severe and the
regulation must survive strict scrutiny review to be upheld.  Should
the parties offer conflicting data, a judge must determine which side
presented more persuasive evidence, using the five percent rule as a
guideline.  Thus, a judge no longer can simply look at a regulation and
decide whether it seems severe.  Instead, the judge must examine hard
data and empirical evidence to guide his or her analysis.
The definition of “burden” is “that which is borne with difficulty;
obligation; onus.”102  A plaintiff, therefore, must present data that an
election regulation creates the requisite difficulty, obligation, or onus
on the voting rights of five percent or more of the electorate for the
burden to be considered severe.  Under this definition, a burden on
the ability to vote might come in many shapes and sizes, such as a
regulation that hinders the ability of voters to make an educated deci-
101 See supra note 33. 
102 RANDOM HOUSE COMPACT UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 279 (Spec. 2d ed. 1996).
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sion by banning all written material in a voting booth,103 a law that
allows political parties to intimidate the opposing party’s voters,104 or
a regulation that bans voters from writing-in a candidate of their
choice.105  Some voters will undoubtedly face these types of burdens
when a state seeks to regulate an election.  The five percent rule stipu-
lates that a state may still impose these burdens on voters as part of its
quest to ensure free and fair elections, but that once a burden begins
to impact five percent of the electorate in a covered jurisdiction, the
state likely has gone too far.
B. Why Five Percent?
The Voting Rights Act requires states and localities to provide
language assistance to non-English-speaking voters if the number of
these voters exceeds five percent of the electorate or 10,000 voters in a
covered jurisdiction.106  A covered jurisdiction is defined as “any
county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not con-
ducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall in-
clude any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for
voting.”107  Covered jurisdictions that must provide language assis-
tance are those in which (1) more than five percent or 10,000 of their
voting-age citizens speak one of the listed foreign languages and have
limited English proficiency, and (2) the illiteracy rates among those
language minorities exceed the national average.108  In short, the lan-
guage assistance provision provides that if an inability to speak the
English language burdens at least five percent of the electorate (or
10,000 voters) who speak one of the listed languages in exercising
their right to vote, the state must step in to provide language assis-
tance in all aspects of the voting process.109
Congress selected five percent or 10,000 voters as triggers be-
cause it determined that these two distinct measures closely “mir-
103 See Cotham v. Garza, 905 F. Supp. 389, 391, 400–01 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that al-
though this election regulation did not impose a severe burden on voters’ rights, the State had
not presented enough evidence to pass constitutional muster under a lower standard of review).
104 See supra Part II.
105 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992) (holding that such a restriction is not a
severe burden on the right to vote).
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(i) (2000).  The “five percent rule” is modeled on this
provision of the Voting Rights Act, and although this Note only refers to the five-percent re-
quirement, a plaintiff can also use the 10,000 voter trigger to demonstrate that an election regu-
lation imposes a severe burden.
107 See 28 C.F.R. § 55.1 (2005).
108 Id. § 55.6.
109 See generally id. § 55.
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ror[ed] the differences in the evidentiary record on the severity of
voting discrimination against language minorities.”110  That is, five
percent or 10,000 voters is a sufficiently low bar to ensure access to
groups that typically encounter language barriers while voting, but
high enough to allow states to regulate elections effectively.  Because
these same principles apply to all election regulation questions, it
makes sense for Congress or the Supreme Court to import the five-
percent requirement into the severe burden test for all election law
challenges.
Since 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice has filed fifteen claims
against jurisdictions in California, Florida, Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, for failing to provide the re-
quired bilingual assistance for non-English-speaking voters.111  Most
of these cases resulted in a consent decree whereby the jurisdiction
agreed to implement language assistance mechanisms.112  In these ju-
risdictions, at least, the Voting Rights Act has removed burdens im-
posed by English-only ballots where the lack of language assistance
burdened five percent or more of the electorate (or at least 10,000
voters) in the covered jurisdiction.
Federal law should guarantee fewer obstacles not only for non-
English-speaking voters, but also for all voters who face election prac-
tices that create burdens on voters’ rights.113  Combined with the se-
vere burden test’s rational basis / strict scrutiny dichotomy, this rule
will safeguard voters’ rights and will continue to allow states to pro-
mote fair and free elections.  Additionally, this rule permits states to
promulgate regulations that impact more than five percent of the elec-
torate in the covered jurisdiction by demonstrating a narrowly tai-
lored, compelling reason for the regulation.  Thus, the five percent
rule will provide guidance to courts and will protect both voters and
states.
110 S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 31 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 798.
111 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Litigation Brought by the Voting Section:
Cases Raising Claims Under the Language Minority Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/caselist.htm#sec203cases (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
112 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Cases Raising Claims Under the Language
Minority Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/re-
cent203.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
113 See generally SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF
VOTER SUPPRESSION 11–16, 121–47 (2006).
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C. Advantages of the Five Percent Rule
There are several advantages that the five percent rule has to of-
fer.  First, the rule will remove a judge’s subjectivity in analyzing elec-
tion regulations, because the rule will require both sides to present
empirical evidence regarding the challenged regulation’s impact on
voters.  Under the rule, a judge no longer will be able simply to specu-
late about whether a regulation will or will not impose a particular
burden.  The test, therefore, is closely associated with the burdens ac-
tually imposed on voters.
Second, the five percent rule will encourage states to create elec-
tion regulations that they know will not adversely impact a significant
percentage of the covered jurisdiction.  Although there is little empiri-
cal evidence to suggest that states will conform their behavior to the
five percent rule, it is presumable that states seek to avoid costly liti-
gation and are proactive in their efforts to comply with the law.114
Thus, with the five percent rule in place, states will be more careful in
their election administration and will conduct studies before promul-
gating a regulation in order to determine proactively the regulation’s
validity.  Furthermore, the five percent rule may decrease the number
of lawsuits voters bring against a state, or at least will ease the disposi-
tion of these cases, because voters will know that if they cannot meet
the initial five-percent threshold, the regulation automatically will be
reviewed under the rational basis test (and thus will make their case
much more difficult to win).  Therefore, the five percent rule will
bring more clarity both to the election administration process and to
judicial review of election regulations.
Finally, the five percent rule protects voters and provides a strong
indication of the true meaning and scope of what the right to vote
really entails, which is absent under current ad hoc election law juris-
prudence.  That is, the rule affirms that states may burden the right to
vote by regulations that adversely impact only a trivial segment of the
electorate, and only to the extent that allows states to administer fair
and free elections effectively.  Without such a rule in place, a judge’s
subjective determination as to whether a regulation seems severe pro-
vides the only indication of the scope of the right to vote.  The five
percent rule thus verifies the fundamental notion that an individual’s
right to vote is usually paramount, subject only to the state’s need to
114 The fact that the Department of Justice website lists only fifteen lawsuits since 2000
stemming from violations of the Voting Rights Act’s language assistance provision likely sug-
gests that many jurisdictions are complying with the law. See generally id. at 125–47.
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promote fair elections and only to an extent reasonably based on em-
pirical evidence.
D. Potential Drawbacks to the Five Percent Rule
The empirical data requirement of the five percent rule may be
problematic in the context of a last-minute election challenge.  In such
a situation, the parties would argue that obtaining empirical evidence
is impossible.  The burden-shifting nature of the five percent rule con-
templates this situation, however, by making voters who seek to
change the status quo first overcome the five-percent threshold.  A
voter may complain that challenging a newly enacted election regula-
tion is difficult because voters do not have the resources to commis-
sion empirical studies.  A meritorious voting rights claim, however,
will likely gain the attention of public interest groups or political par-
ties, who will probably assist the voter in his or her challenge and may
already possess empirical data regarding similar election schemes
from other jurisdictions.115  Additionally, the five percent rule miti-
gates the difficulty that an empirical evidence obligation may impose
on states by requiring a state to present a study only after the plaintiff
overcomes the initial five-percent burden.  Because the consequence
to the state for failing to present a valid study refuting the voters’ five-
percent claim is strict scrutiny review of the regulation, states are best
off if they pass election regulations only after gathering empirical data
on a regulation’s impact.116  Thus, the five percent rule protects voters
from onerous election laws, provides states with the ability to regulate
115 The Ohio partisan challenger cases provide just one example of a last-minute challenge
where voters had empirical data to support their claim. See supra Part II.  Groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union regularly compile statistics on election law issues. See ACLU,
Voting Rights, http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).  The five
percent rule would also create an incentive for public interest groups to conduct these studies
proactively, providing another independent source of election protection.  Additionally, the U.S.
Constitution and federal statutes supply a layer of protection beyond the five percent rule. See
infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.  Should Congress believe that voters need even more 
protection, legislators can pass a law that limits or completely bans certain state election regula-
tions, irrespective of the five percent rule. In light of the five percent rule’s data requirement,
Congress may want to protect other rights associated with voting that do not lend themselves to
easy calculation.  That is, Congress can decide that specific burdens already are per se severe,
triggering strict scrutiny review.  Thus, the empirical evidence requirement should not pose a
barrier to voters bringing a claim.
116 This solution will likely require states to spend more money in administering elections
because a state must undergo empirical review of every election regulation that the state be-
lieves a voter can successfully challenge.  While this is a potential shortcoming of the five percent
rule, it is a small price to pay for a democracy that highly values the right of an individual to cast
his or her ballot.
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elections, and encourages both sides to obtain empirical data before
bringing or defending a voting rights lawsuit.
Another potential weakness of the five percent rule is that the
rule does not completely eliminate the subjectivity surrounding the
assessment of election regulation challenges.  If both the voter and the
state present valid and compelling empirical studies, a judge must de-
cide which study is more persuasive to resolve the severe burden ques-
tion.117  But a judge still must provide reasons why one study is better
than another.  That is, it is impossible to take away all judicial subjec-
tivity in an election regulation case, especially because there is argua-
bly a certain degree of subjectivity in any judicial decision.118  Judges
often weigh competing evidence and determine which side’s case is
stronger.  This judicial role is no different with the five percent rule.
The five percent rule offers a distinct advantage to the analysis, how-
ever, by providing judges with a benchmark from which to make this
determination, instead of requiring judges to surmise subjectively
whether the regulation imposes a severe or more reasonable burden
on voters’ rights.  While complete objectivity is impossible, the five
percent rule supplies needed structure to a judge’s analysis and there-
fore offers a marked improvement over the status quo.
A final potential limitation of the five percent rule is that it is a
numerical benchmark.  Because the five percent rule imposes only ra-
tional basis review for regulations that burden five percent or less of
the electorate, a state might be able to enact a regulation that still
unfairly burdens a significant number of voters.  It is important, there-
fore, to remember that the five percent rule operates in conjunction
with all other election laws.  For example, a state cannot create a regu-
lation that burdens 4.9% of black voters or women voters: under sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act, states cannot administer elections in a
racially discriminatory manner,119 and the Nineteenth Amendment to
the Constitution guarantees voting rights for women.120  Congress also
117 Judges also must disregard unreliable studies or “junk science,” which in this context
can include studies backed solely by a political agenda. Cf. Kumho Tires v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 152, 158 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
118 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Per-
son Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 344 (1997) (citing Judge
Cardozo’s maxim that “the role of a judge is one of creation,” which “underscores the subjec-
tiveness of the judicial decision-making process”); Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It when I See It,”
105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1042, 1044 (1996) (“Law is not all reasoning and analysis—it is also emotion
and judgment and intuition and rhetoric.  It includes knowledge that cannot always be explained,
but that is no less valid for that.”).
119 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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may choose to protect against other unfair election regulations irre-
spective of the five percent rule’s requirements,121 especially if Con-
gress determines that voters or states are unable to quantify the
impact of certain practices.122  Moreover, voting rights, which are fun-
damental to the success of a democracy, should have multiple layers of
protection.  Therefore, the five percent rule, when combined with
other election laws, will ensure that state regulations are not aimed at
disenfranchising any particular group and are implemented only for
the purpose of ensuring fair and smooth elections.
E. Enacting the Five Percent Rule
A congressional act is the best method to promulgate the five
percent rule, especially because the rule derives from the Voting
Rights Act’s language assistance provision.123  Congress should deter-
mine that it must protect the right to vote from state regulations that
severely hamper electoral access, much like it determined that non-
English speakers need language assistance to vote.124  Therefore, Con-
gress should enact the five percent rule as part of an update to the
Voting Rights Act.  Because discrimination in election administration
is still a problem, Congress should use its power to regulate elections
to protect voter rights through the five percent rule.125
121 See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15306).
122 Most voting rights protections can be evaluated by a study or other empirical evidence.
See supra Part III.A.  Recognizing that Congress can vindicate rights regardless of the empirical
evidence requirement simply demonstrates that the five percent rule adds an additional layer
to—but does not eliminate—protections for voters.
123 See supra Part III.B.
124 Congress explicitly stated its reasons for enacting the language assistance provisions in
the statute itself:
[T]hrough the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of language minori-
ties have been effectively excluded from participation in the electoral process.
Among other factors, the denial of the right to vote of such minority group citizens
is ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational opportunities afforded
them resulting in high illiteracy and low voting participation.  The Congress de-
clares that, in order to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution, it is necessary to eliminate such
discrimination by prohibiting these practices, and by prescribing other remedial
devices.
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(a).
125 See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Rem-
edies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 733 (1998) (stating that Congress has the power
to remedy discrimination and regulate state elections through the Voting Rights Act). But see
Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178–79 (2005) (arguing that election
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Alternatively, the judiciary can act to modify the severe burden
test to encompass the five percent rule.  The Supreme Court has al-
ready enacted similar judicial standards in the voting rights arena.  For
example, the Court created the judicially manageable standard of
“one person, one vote” for redistricting cases.126  If courts can create
judicially manageable standards for election regulation questions,
there is no reason why the judiciary cannot also modify these stan-
dards to guide the review process.  Moreover, the severe burden test is
already a Court-made standard, suggesting that the Court is perfectly
within its bounds to update the test should Congress fail to act.
F. The Five Percent Rule in Action
The situation in Ohio before the 2004 election would have been
immensely different under the five percent rule.  Instead of issuing
markedly different opinions that failed to provide reasons to support
their severe burden analyses, the judges reviewing the cases could
have used a clear principle to inform their decisions, and the opinions
would have been much more objective and well reasoned.
The voters initially would have had to show that the State’s deci-
sion to allow challengers at the polls would burden five percent or
more (or 10,000 or more) of the voters in the county.  The plaintiffs
could have presented a study to demonstrate that challengers intimi-
date, confuse, or delay the requisite number of voters to meet this
threshold requirement.  If the plaintiffs had presented this data, Ohio
would then have had to show that allowing Republican Party chal-
lengers would not produce this onus on five percent of the electorate
(or 10,000 voters).  The State could have supported its case through
historical models of voting patterns, empirical evidence that challeng-
ers do not intimidate blacks or other voters from going to the polls, or
data showing that challengers do not improperly challenge voters.
The judge would have then decided which side had submitted the
most persuasive evidence.  If the plaintiffs had provided the most con-
vincing study and proved that allowing challengers would burden
more than five percent of the electorate, the court would have viewed
the regulation under the lens of strict scrutiny; on the other hand, if
the State had offered the most compelling evidence and demonstrated
that challengers would burden less than five percent of voters, the
court would have evaluated the regulation using rational basis review.
administration discrimination is not widespread and that congressional action to regulate local
elections violates principles of federalism).
126 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 568 (1964).
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The Supreme Court’s severe burden jurisprudence also would be
clearer and more consistent under the five percent rule.  For example,
in Burdick, the Court ruled that a ban on write-in voting constituted
only a limited burden and therefore was valid so long as it was reason-
ably related to a legitimate state goal.127  Under the five percent rule,
the question would have been whether five percent or more of voters
were going to use a write-in ballot to cast a vote for a candidate not on
the ballot in that election.  This evidence could have been shown
through political surveys or other empirical data.  If write-in candi-
dates would have received five percent or more of the votes from the
electorate in the covered jurisdiction, the write-in ban would have im-
posed a severe burden on voters and would have been subject to strict
scrutiny review.  Thus, instead of simply ruling that a write-in ballot is
only a limited burden on individual voters, the Court would have had
to examine the implications of its ruling on the entire electorate af-
fected by its decision.
A similar inquiry would have taken place in Timmons.  In Tim-
mons, the Court upheld a Minnesota law prohibiting “fusion” candi-
dates who appeared on the ballot for more than one political party
because the burden did not seem severe, but the Justices failed to pro-
vide concrete reasons why the regulation imposed only minimal bur-
dens on voters’ rights.128  Under the five percent rule, the Court would
have assessed the actual effect of the ban after reviewing hard data: if
five percent or more of the electorate in the covered jurisdiction
would not have been able to vote for their candidate of choice be-
cause that candidate was not listed under the voters’ political party
preference, the burden would have been severe.  On the other hand,
voters who supported minor parties and fringe candidates may not
have suffered this burden or may not have made up five percent of the
electorate, in which case the fusion candidate ban would not have
been severe.  The point is not that the Supreme Court made an im-
proper decision regarding the merits of the case.  Rather, it is that the
Court’s opinion and analysis should have been based on concrete
standards that addressed the actual impact felt by a significant number
of voters.
Other election regulations that impact the ability of voters to cast
ballots would face the same consistent evaluation.  For example, a
judge analyzing the magnitude of the burden imposed on voters from
reducing the number of poll machines at an election site would evalu-
127 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 436–40 (1992).
128 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 362–63 (1997).
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ate empirical evidence presented by the parties.  This data must
demonstrate the impact created by fewer polling machines to deter-
mine if the regulation burdens more than five percent of voters.  Simi-
larly, the five percent rule can be used for voter identification
requirements, a current “hot topic” in election law.129
Conclusion
Under this new formulation of the severe burden test, “five per-
cent” can act as a guiding light for “severe burden” in a judge’s analy-
sis, taking away some of the subjectivity and requiring judges to
evaluate hard evidence.  Although the five percent rule is not perfect
in removing all subjectivity from the severe burden question, it
changes the scope of the analysis and provides a clear benchmark for
a judge’s decision.  The five percent rule removes the ability of a judge
to look at a regulation and decide for herself, on an ad hoc basis,
whether it imposes a severe burden.  In the end, the five percent rule
is a mechanism to bring some certainty to the severe burden test, ar-
ticulate the scope of the right to vote, and define the extent to which
states can regulate elections.
George W. Bush won the State of Ohio in 2004 by only two per-
cent of the total vote,130 and won Hamilton County, the jurisdiction
impacted by one of the voter challenger decisions, by less than 23,000
votes out of over 420,000 ballots cast.131  Perhaps the outcome would
have been different had the courts prevented the Republican Party
from challenging individuals’ eligibility to vote.132  More ominously for
the future, the courts’ decisions regarding Republican Party challeng-
ers failed to articulate what types of state election laws are constitu-
tional.  Under the current severe burden test, when (and not “if”) the
2008 presidential election produces an election regulation challenge,
voters and states will still face uncertainty regarding the types of bur-
dens that states may impose on voters’ rights.  Judges will make specu-
129 Voter identification is a hotly contested topic and could be the entire subject of another
article. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127,
1144–54 (2006).  For purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to state that beyond satisfying the
severe burden test through the five percent rule, a voter identification requirement—like any
other election regulation—will also have to pass the Voting Rights Act’s section 2 discriminatory
impact test. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)–(b) (2000).
130 See CNN.com Election Results: U.S. President / Ohio, http://www.cnn.com/ELEC-
TION/2004/pages/results/states/OH/P/00/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
131 See CNN.com Election Results: U.S. President / Ohio / County Results, http://www.cnn.
com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/OH/P/00/county.001.html#39061 (last visited Nov. 8,
2006).
132 There is no available data on the actual impact of Republican Party challengers in Ohio.
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lative decisions regarding the extent to which a regulation actually
burdens voters.  Millions of dollars will be spent on election law litiga-
tion, with so much at stake but so little clarity as to how judges should
review a state election regulation.  The five percent rule will help to
provide some needed certainty as the United States veers toward what
promises to be another contentious election season.
